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ABSTRACT 
 
With the development of international markets and the globalization of economic 
activities, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as a strategy for both internal and external 
growth become more and more important. A representative case is the M&A 
transactions in North American and European airline industry. This paper investigates 
the impact of mergers and acquisitions on value creation for the bidding firms. Using 
data on 32 mergers and acquisitions between 2000 and 2008 and employing the 
well-established event study methodology, the paper concludes that M&A transactions 
in North American and European airline industry create a statistically significant value 
for the shareholders of the acquiring firms. Then the factors of M&A-success are 
analyzed by applying cross-sectional regression. The results in this paper would 
supply guidelines for the shareholders, managers and investors when they consider 
acquisitions decisions. 
 
Key Words: M&As, Airline Industry, Event Study, Value Creation.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent decades, one of the most distinct developments has been the ever-increasing 
globalization of markets and economic activities. Under this background, the mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As) as an important strategy give firms a good opportunity for 
internal or external growth. Airline industry is a global and mature industry, M&As 
frequently take place in this industry. Unlike the businesses of large firms in other 
industries which are diversified, the airline industry is more focused on airline 
business. Thus the effects of horizontal M&A in this kind of industry are more 
prominent. A typical case is the recent transactions in North American and European 
airline industry. Since airline firms in North American and European areas have taken 
most market shares in the world airline industry, this paper only focuses on this. 
 
Deregulation is the original factor to simulate the M&As of airline industry. It has had 
profound effect on the structure of whole industry. In 1978, The United States was the 
first country which deregulated their airline industry, and then more than 200 US 
airlines have merged. Later other countries also deregulated their airline industry 
gradually, such as Australia, Canada and Japan. Deregulation of the European Union 
airspace happened in the early 1990s (Myron 2002). The final stage of EU's 
deregulation took effect in April 1997, allowing an airline from one member state to 
fly passengers within another member's domestic market (The Airline Industry, 2008).  
  
Moreover, the deregulation environment has paved the way for the emergence of low 
costs carriers because entry barriers for new airlines are lower in a deregulated market. 
This has produced far greater competition than before deregulation in most markets, 
and average fares tend to drop 20% or more. Toward the end of the last century, a new 
style of low cost airline emerged, offering a no-frills product at a lower price. 
Southwest Airlines, JetBlue and other low-cost carriers began to represent a serious 
challenge to traditional airlines, as did their low-cost counterparts in many other 
countries. Airlines such as EasyJet and Ryanair have grown at the expense of the 
traditional national airlines too (Myron 2002). 
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There has also been a trend for these national airlines themselves to be privatized such 
as British Airways. The added competition, together with pricing freedom, means that 
new entrants often take market share with highly reduced rates that, to a limited 
degree, full service airlines must match. This is a major constraint on profitability for 
established carriers, which tend to have a higher cost base. As a result, profitability in 
a deregulated market is uneven for most airlines (Myron 2002).  
 
In a word, due to low growth rates on domestic markets and growing competitive 
pressures in airline industry, M&As are becoming more and more important strategy 
for achieving international market shares. However，the debates about the value 
creation for the bidder or target firm in airline industry still exist. Knapp (1990) tested 
the US horizontal airline merges in the year 1986 and found that the abnormal returns 
for bidders were positive and significant around merger announcement. Bidders 
earned an excess return between 6% and 12% depending on event period (Knapp 
1990). Kyle et al. (1992) examined 24 US airline merges which undertook 
announcement date in the time interval of 1978 and 1989. For three-day event 
window around first announcement, an abnormal return increased 3.72% on bidder’s 
stock price (Kyle, Strickland et al. 1992). Singal (1996) analyzed 14 successful 
horizontal US airline merges from 1985 to 1988 under 4 different event window and 
documented that the acquiring firms earned between 2.51% and 0.55% (Signal 1996). 
Zhang and Aldridge (1997) investigated the merge in the Canadian airline industry for 
the 1992-1993 period and they found that news that affected the merger possibilities 
had a significant impact on the stock prices of the two major Canadian airlines (Zhang 
and Aldridge 1997). Friesen (2005) applied event study based on 19 announcements 
concerning the friendly merger process of Air France and KLM between September 
2003 and June 2004 and found that the shareholder of acquiring firm gained 
insignificant abnormal returns (Friesen 2005).  
 
In this paper we apply event study to determine whether M&A activity generates a 
significantly positive value for the acquiring firm. The sample period is from 2000 to 
2008. Since the target firms’ data are not available after M&As, this paper only 
focuses on the change of shareholder’s return on the bidding firm. Here event study is 
applied to announcements of 32 M&As in North American and European airline 
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industry. We apply cross-sectional regression analysis to examine the factors of 
M&As further. 
 
While there are a few such studies regarding to M&As related events in airline 
industry, most are focused on U.S. airline. So this paper contributes to the existing 
literature in three ways. First of all, it broadens the regional scope of the literature on 
event study methodology in M&As issues beyond the United States. On the other 
hand, the data is updated to assess the most recent M&As’ effects. Secondly, most of 
the previous literature employs market model to measure the normal returns in the 
event window, while this paper applies both market model and multifactor model to 
get more accurate normal return estimates. Finally, this paper examines the factors 
explaining M&A further by applying a cross-sectional regression method. 
 
Section 2 provides the overview of the event study methodology. Section 3 includes 
the data selection and sample design. Section 4 contains our empirical results and 
presents the analysis of the empirical results and then compares them according to 
different specification. Section 5 outlines the summary of this research and 
managerial implication. 
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2. Methodology 
 
This paper aims at explaining the value creation for bidders in mergers and 
acquisitions in North American and European airline industry. In order to differentiate 
between the value-creating and the value-destroying M&As, we use event study 
methodology to measure abnormal changes in the stock prices of publicly traded 
companies that occur in conjunction with an “event” (Brown Stephen and Warner 
Jerold 1985; Wells William 2004). The researcher observes the actual stock returns 
over the period of interest and computes the differences between the actual returns 
and the expected returns and then tests whether the results are statistically significant 
different from zero.  
 
It should be noted that there are two assumptions for applying event study. The first 
one is the market efficient hypothesis. Fama (1991) divided the efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH) into three categories. They are weak-form, semistrong-form and 
strong-form efficient markets. We pay more attentions to the semistrong form since 
event studies methodology is employed to test it. The semistrong form of the EMH 
holds that security prices rapidly adjust to the arrival of all new public information. As 
such, current security prices fully reflect all publicly available information (Eugene 
1991). Under market efficient hypothesis, investors should not be able to earn positive 
abnormal returns by buying or selling based on types of firm events. 
 
Second, the events should be unanticipated. Abnormal returns can be assumed to be 
the result of the stock market’s reacting to new information. The announcement effect 
is hard to test when the event has been anticipated by traders or information disclosed 
to the market before the announcement date (McWilliams and Siegel 1997). 
 
In the following section, we will describe event study methodology briefly, which is 
based on Campbell, Lo and Mackinglay Chapter 4 (MacKinlay 1997). Before 
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modeling normal return, some notations are introduced. We define 0 as the 
announcement date, 0T  to 1T  as the estimation window, which contains 1L  return 
observations and 1T  to 2T as the event window containing 2L  return observations. 
2T  to 3T  as the post event window. 
 
2.1 Modeling Normal Returns 
 
Before modeling normal return, daily stock returns should be calculated. Wells (2004) 
has shown that the natural logarithmic daily stock price is better than simple 
percentage changes of daily price. The reason is the latter measurement can bring 
about arithmetic anomaly problem and thus biased results (Wells William 2004). The 
rate of return on security i for day t is defined by itR  
 
,
, 1
i t
it
i t
P
R Ln
P
−
 
=  
  
 
where itR = rate of return on security i for day t 
      
,i tP =daily stock price for security i for day t 
     
, 1i tP − = daily stock price for security i for day t-1 
 
The normal return is defined as the expected return if the event does not happen. 
There are three most commonly used models to estimate the normal return. (1) 
Constant mean return model, (2) Market model, a one factor model which is based on 
i.e. CAPM and (3) Multifactor model. The last two models will be applied to this 
study and will be explained in more detail in the below sections. 
 
The market model assumes a stable relation between the market return and the 
security return as follows. 
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iit i mt itR Rα β ε= + +  
where itR  and mtR are the rate of returns on security i and the market portfolio over 
the estimation window, respectively, and itε  is the zero mean disturbance term. In 
our case, the S&P 500 Index is used as the proxy for the market portfolio. Using the 
estimation window, i  α and iβ are achieved by applying OLS.  
 
Factor models are motivated by the benefits of reducing the variance of the abnormal 
return by explaining more of the variation in the normal return. The variance 
reduction will typically be greatest in cases where the sample firms have a common 
characteristic, for example they are all members of one industry (MacKinlay 1997). 
 
The multifactor model in our study includes the return on the US airline industry 
index ktR  in addition to the market portfolio S&P 500. 
 
iit i mt i kt itR R Rα β γ ε= + + +  
 
When conducting the multifactor model, besides US airline industry index, other 
factors, such as the European airline industry index and the oil price are also 
examined. But the explaining power of using those factors is quite small and hence 
the reduction of variance of these abnormal returns is very little. 
 
In our study, both two models are applied. But generally, 2R  of the multifactor 
model is much greater than that of the market model. The higher the 2R , the greater 
the variance reduction of the abnormal return and the larger is the gains. Thus the 
multifactor model will give us more accurate normal return.  
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2.2 Measuring Abnormal Returns 
 
The market model and multifactor model used to estimate the normal returns can be 
also expressed as a regression system, 
 
i i i itR X θ ε= +  
In our case, where 
0 11
[ ...... ]i iT iTR R R+ ′=  is an ( 1L ×1) vector of estimation window 
returns iX is an ( 1 1L K× + ) matrix of K explanatory variables of the model in 
addition to a vector of ones in the first column for the intercept and iθ is a ( 1 1K + × ) 
parameter vector. For the market model m[  R ]iX ι= where 0 11[ ...... ]m mT mTR R R+ ′= and 
'
i[  ]i iθ α β= . For the multifactor model, m k[  R  R ]iX ι=  and 'i i[   ]i iθ α β γ= . The 
OLS estimator can be estimated below. 
 
1
2
1
ˆ ( )
1
ˆ
2i
i i i i i
i i
X X X R
Lε
θ
σ ε ε
−′ ′=
′=
−
 
 
The abnormal return is the difference between the actual return and the expected 
normal return  
 
* * *
ˆ
ˆi i i iR Xε θ= −  
where 
1 2
*
1...... 1[ ]i iT TR R R+ ′=  is an ( 2 1L × ) vector of event window returns, *iX is an 
( 2 K+1L × ) matrix with the vector of ones in the first column and the vector of the 
explanatory variables in the event window in the other columns. The abnormal return 
vector will be jointly normally distributed with a zero conditional mean and 
conditional covariance matrix iV . That is, 
* *
ˆ[ ] (0, )i i iE X N Vε ∼  
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where 2 * 1 * 2ˆ ˆ( )
i ii i i i i
V I X X X Xε εσ σ
−′ ′= +  and I  is 2 2L L× identity matrix. 
 
2.3 Testing Abnormal Returns 
 
To draw the overall inferences for the event analysis, the abnormal returns should be 
aggregated through time and across securities. 
 
The cumulative abnormal return for security i is the sum of abnormal returns in a 
given time period. Define 1 2( , )iCAR s s
?
 as the cumulative abnormal return for 
security i from 1s  to 2s , where 1 1 2 2T s s T< ≤ ≤ . Following equation is used to test if 
the abnormal returns of individual security through time are significantly different 
from zero. If they are not significant, it means the unanticipated event has no effect on 
the cumulative abnormal returns. 
 


1
1 2
1 2 ( 2)2
1 2
CAR ( , )( , ) ( , )
i
L
i
s sSCAR s s t
s sσ −
= ∼  
where  *1 2 ˆCAR ( , )i is s γ ε′≡  and  21 2 1 2[CAR ( , )] ( , )i i iVAR s s s s Vσ γ γ′= =   
and γ  is an ( 2L  ×1) vector of ones in positions 1 1s T−  to 2 1s T−  and zeroes 
elsewhere 
 
The equation below is used to test the null hypothesis that aggregation abnormal 
returns across securities and through time are significantly different from zero. 
 
1/21
1 2
1
( 4)( ) ( , ) N(0,1)
aN LJ SCAR s s
L K
−
=
−
∼  
K is the number of parameters, i.e. K=2 for market model and K=3 for multifactor 
model.
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2.4 Cross-sectional Approach to Explain CARi 
 
Theoretical insights can result from examining the association between the magnitude 
of the abnormal return and characteristics specific to the event observation. So a 
cross-sectional regression model is an appropriate tool to investigate this association. 
The basic approach is to run a cross-sectional regression of the abnormal returns on 
the characteristics of interest (MacKinlay 1997). To analyze this relation we can 
estimate the following regression model with OLS 
 
y η= ΖΒ +  
where y is an ( 1N × ) vector of cumulative abnormal returns 1 2( , )iCAR s s , Z is an 
( N K× ) matrix of characteristics with first column consisting of ones and B is a 
( 1K × ) parameter vector. 
 
3. Sample Data and Design 
 
3.1 Sample Data 
 
The primary data employed in this paper are the daily stocks of bidders. Both daily 
stock prices and M&As’ announcement dates in the airline industry were obtained 
from Lund University Financial DataStream—LINC. The data of the variables used in 
the cross-sectional regression, such as total revenue and total assets, were obtained 
from each firm’s annual report. They were based on the fiscal year-end data preceding 
the event. 
 
In fact, more than 32 M&As happened in the North American and European airline 
industry during this period. The chosen airlines must meet the following criteria 
(Kusnadi and Sohrabian 1999; Cybo-Ottone and Murgia 2000): 
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(1) The transaction was announced between January 1, 2000 and October 31, 2008. 
(2) The acquiring firm’s stock is publicly traded. 
(3) The bidder is North American or European airline companies which include both 
international airline and regional airline firm. 
(4) The targets should be airline firms too, but not limited for the targets’ regions.  
(5) Daily returns for the acquiring firms’ securities and for the corresponding local 
market index must be available from Datastream for at least the 90-trading-day prior 
to the announcement date. 
(6) The information related to the M&A, such as the type of transaction, trade value 
and announcement date was publicly disclosed. 
(7) All the M&A transactions were complete. The pending or cancelled M&As were 
not included. 
 
The event date is defined by the first announcement of the transactions. Actually, 
more than one event happened in the same event window, in order to avoid 
overlapping problem, we chose the first announcement date as the event of interest 
and deleted the other events’ data. Thus the final sample (Table 1) just consists of 32 
events. According to the different methods of payment, the sample of 32 M&As 
transactions included 9 of them which used equity to finance the acquisition and 23 
cash payments transactions. From the geographical prospective, there were 15 
domestic transactions and 17 cross-border transactions in the whole sample. In 
addition, 17 transactions took place under bull market and the rest experienced the 
bear market. 
 
3.2 Sample Design 
 
The initial task of conducting an event study was to define the event of interest, and in 
our case was M&As in North American and European Airlines from 2000 to 2008. 
Then the length of the estimation window should be determined. Our estimation 
window is the 90-day period (-100 to -11) preceding the event date. Afterwards the 
June 2009, Lund 
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period had to be identified over which the stock prices of the firms involved in this 
event would be examined (event window). And it was customary to define the event 
window as larger than the specific period of interest, especially in cases where the 
event was an announcement of an acquisition, (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997).  
 
Three event windows with different lengths were used:  a relatively long event 
window (from t= -10 to +10), medium event window (from t= -5 to +5); and the usual 
three-day event window (from t=-1 to +1). The (-10, +10) event window can capture 
uncertainty about information exactly revealed. The three-day event window (from t = 
-1 to +1) permitted us to investigate the market efficiency assumptions. The following 
figure will present intuitive idea about the cycle of the event study.  
 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of Event Study
June 2009, Lund 
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3.3 Cross-sectional Regression 
 
In this study, the dependent variable was Cumulative abnormal returns for all security 
in 3-day time window, which was defined as ( 1, 1)iCAR − + . ( 1, 1)iCAR − +  were 
regressed on the logarithm value of the total revenue, the logarithm value of the total 
assets and other three dummy variables. The total revenue represented the operational 
ability of bidding firm, while total asset could be a proxy for the firm size. Three 
dummy variables were used to examine geographic focus, means of payment and 
business cycles respectively. The domestic deals were defined as 1 and 0 stood for the 
cross-border mergers. The payment method was a dummy variable with the value 1 if 
the method of payment was cash and 0 if stock-stock. If the M&A activities happened 
under the bull market, we set 1 and 0 otherwise. It is noted that the classification of 
the stock market situation based on the following figure which was obtained from the 
yahoo finance website. The bear markets have two periods: one was from Jan 3rd 2000 
to Mar 3rd 2003; the other was from Oct 5th 2007 until now. The bull market was from 
Mar 4th 2003 to Oct 15th 2007. 
 
 
Figure 2. Dow Jones Industrial Average Source: YAHOO! FINANCE, 
http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=%5EDJI 
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Table 1. 32 Merge and Acquisition Events 
 
Date Acquirer Target Country of Acquirer 
Country of 
target 
Transaction 
Value At 
Announcement 
(USD) 
20-Apr-01 SAS AB SAS Norge ASA Sweden Sweden stocks 
1-Nov-01 Scandinavian Airlines System AB Air Baltic Sweden Latvia 8943105.6 
22-Nov-03 Scandinavian Airlines System AB Spanair SA Sweden Spain 87564225 
26-Jun-07 SAS AB Spanair SA Sweden Spain stocks 
14-Feb-08 SAS AB Go Now AS Sweden Norway stocks 
23-Jan-01 Lufthansa AG Composite International Inc Germany United States stocks 
11-Nov-02 Deutsche Lufthansa AG British midland Airways Ltd Germany United Kingdom stocks 
10-Feb-05 Deutsche Lufthansa AG Amadeus Global Travel Distribution SA Germany Spain 5182053300 
21-Jun-07 Deutsche Lufthansa AG Swiss International Air Lines Ltd Germany Switzerland stocks 
29-Oct-08 Deutsche Lufthansa AG Eurowings Luftverkehrs AG Germany Germany stocks 
1-Nov-04 Transat AT Inc Air Consultants Europe Canada Netherlands 862.03 
13-Mar-06 Transat AT Inc Thomas Cook Travel Ltd Canada Canada 6372992.29 
13-Jul-07 Transat AT Inc L'Europeennee de Tourisme SARL Canada France 4781257.47 
1-Jan-00 British Airways PLC Comair United Kingdom South Africa 27507700 
2-Jul-08 British Airways PLC Elysair SAS United Kingdom France 55855800 
16-May-02 EasyJet PLC Newgo 1 Ltd United Kingdom United Kingdom 546414000 
25-Oct-07 EasyJet PLC GB Airways Ltd United Kingdom Gibraltar 212133600 
11-Oct-06 Air Partner PLC Gold Air International Ltd United Kingdom United Kingdom 8160460 
6-Sep-07 Air Partner PLC Air Partner International SAS United Kingdom France 1883700 
25-May-07 Riverhawk Aviation Inc Profile Aviation Center Inc United States United States 5500000 
June 2009, Lund 
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Continued 
19-Mar-08 Riverhawk Aviation Inc Carolina Air Charter Inc United States United States 425000 
9-Oct-00 Continental Airlines Inc DC Air United States United States 215000000 
9-Sep-02 JetBlue Airways Live LLC United States United States 80000000 
31-Jan-03 Ryanair Holdings Plc buzz Ireland United Kingdom 21753225 
10-Dec-04 Southwest Airlines Inc Certain assets of ATA Airlines Inc United States United States 117000000 
1-Aug-05 Republic Airways Holdings Inc US Airways' 10 Embraer 170s and Other Assets United States United States 100000000 
15-Aug-05 Skywest Inc Atlantic Southeast Airlines Inc United States United States 425000000 
18-Jan-07 Pinnacle Airlines Corp Colgan Air Inc United States United States 20000000 
24-Apr-07 Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA FlyNordic AB Norway Sweden stocks 
20-Jun-07 Discovery Air Inc Top Aces Inc Canada Canada 62302950.45 
21-Jun-07 Air France-KLM Martinair Holland NV France Netherlands stocks 
14-Apr-08 Delta Air Lines Inc Northwest Airlines Corp United States United States 3100000000 
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4. Empirical Results 
 
We employed both market model and multifactor model to measure normal returns. 
Although multifactor model produces only marginal benefits over a standard market 
model in predicting event day normal returns, it generates less skewed abnormal 
returns that are better suited for statistical tests (Ahern 2009). So the following results 
are based on the multifactor model. The results from market model are mostly as 
similar as the results of multifactor model and are shown in the appendix. 
 
4.1 Individual Security Analysis under The 21-day Event Window 
 
Our study is based on 32 M&As in European and North American airline industry 
between 2000 and 2008. CARs are calculated for the individual M&A event. The 
empirical results of individual security are analyzed one by one.  
 
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
CA
R
SAS Norge ASA Air Baltic Spanair SA Spanair SA Go Now AS
  
Figure 3. SAS AB-Cumulative Abnormal Return (-10, +10) 
 
We start by discussing Scandinavian Airlines System AB (SAS) five mergers and 
acquisitions during 2000-2008. The SAS Norge ASA deal transacted in April, 
2001.CARs were positive except CAR (-10,-2) and CAR (-10,-1), which were about 
-3%. Air Baltic deal took place in November, 2001 perceived positively cumulative 
abnormal returns during the 21-day event window. The takeover of Spanair SA in 
November, 2003 resulted in all cumulative negatively abnormal returns during the 
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21-day event window. But on the announcement date, CAR reverted to zero. Although 
the cumulative abnormal returns fluctuated when SAS took the second deal with 
Spanair SA, the volatility of CAR (-10, +10) was not large. The cumulative abnormal 
returns for transactions of Go Now AS also fluctuated around zero during the 21-day 
event window. However, CAR (-10, +10) of SAS AB five transactions were all 
insignificant.   
 
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
CA
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Composite International Inc British Midland Airways Ltd
Amadeus Global Travel Distribution SA Swiss International Air Lines Ltd
Eurowings Luftverkehrs AG
 
Figure 4. Deutsche Lufthansa AG-Cumulative Abnormal Return (-10, +10) 
 
For Deutsche Lufthansa AG, there were five M&A activities. Except Swiss 
International Air Lines deal, others were negatively absorbed by the capital market. 
Specially, the Eurowings Luftverkehrs AG deal cumulated about 19% negative 
abnormal returns during the 21-day event window. This result was statistically 
significant at the 10% confidence level. While the results for other deals are 
statistically insignificant. 
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Figure 5. Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA-Cumulative Abnormal Return (-10, +10) 
 
For Norwegian Air, the complete takeover of Fly Nordic AB airline in April 2007, 
first cumulated 15% positive abnormal returns near the announcement day, then 
increased stock prices faster than before, and finally led to 30% gains for shareholders 
of Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA. The result was significant at 10% confidence level. 
 
Three groups could be classified for the rest M&A activities according to different 
trends of cumulative abnormal returns near the announcement day. Group one is that 
CAR (-10, +10) has an increasing trend. It includes the first deal of Air Partner and 
Riverhawk Aviation, the second deal of British Airways, EasyJet PLC, Republic 
Airways, JetBlue and SkyWest. The maximum CAR (-10, +10) comes from 
Riverhawk Aviation Inc’s first deal. The acquisition of Carolina Air Charter Inc in 
May 2007 led to a 94% increase in the stock price of Riverhawk. Group two is that 
there is a decreasing trend on CAR (-10, +10) such as Southwest Airlines and 
Pinnacle Airline. And the deal of Colgan Air Inc decreased the stock price of Pinnacle 
Airline by 15%. Group three is that CAR (-10, +10) fluctuates around zero frequently, 
the transactions just had positive CARs near the announcement date, like Continental 
Airline, Delta Air Line, Ryanair Holdings and Air France-KLM. However none of the 
acquisitions above shows statistically significant CARs in the 21-day event window. 
The insignificant Cumulative Abnormal Return (-10, +10) graphs are shown in the 
appendix.
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4.2 Individual Security Analysis under Other Event Windows 
 
Since there are just two M&A transactions which are statistically significant under the 
21-day event window, we test another two relative short event windows to investigate 
the effect of M&A further. All the statistic results under three different event windows 
are shown in table 2. 
 
For the 11-day event window, there are six M&A events with statistically significant 
results. These are shown below: the deal that Deutsche Lufthansa AG acquired 
Eurowings, the transaction that EasyJet acquired Newgo, the deal that Riverhawk 
acquired Profile Aviation Center, as well as three single transactions including JetBlue, 
Norwegian, and SkyWest. Except Deutsche Lufthansa’s M&A which had a 12% 
negative CAR with the statistical significance at the 5%, all other M&A activities 
created value for the bidding firm. Specially, the first transaction of Riverhawk, 
Profile Aviation Center, cumulated 116% positive abnormal returns at the 10% 
significant level, and EasyJet’s first deal increased the stock price by 24%, statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  
 
For the event window (from t = -1 to +1), the number of significant results is almost 
the same as that of the 11-day event window, seven M&A transactions have 
significant results. Compared with the previous results, two M&A transactions 
become significant and one M&A turns to be insignificant. For those two significant 
deals, one is that the acquisition of SAS Norge ASA has a slightly positive 6% 
cumulative abnormal return at the 10% significant level. The other is that the second 
deal of Riverhawk leads to a 67% increase on its stock price at the 10% level. The 
transaction of Eurowings Luftverkehrs has a negatively cumulative abnormal return, 
but this result becomes insignificant when the event window changes from 11 days to 
3 days. In a word, all the significant transactions have positive cumulative abnormal 
returns under the 3-day event window.  
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Table 2 Significant Test for Individual Event- Multifactor Model 
 Acquirer Target CAR(-10,+10) CAR(-5,+5) CAR(-1,+1) 
20-Apr-01 SAS AB SAS Norge ASA 0.0173 -0.0221 0.0589* 
1-Nov-01 Scandinavian Airlines System AB Air Baltic 0.0994 -0.0312 -0.0623 
22-Nov-03 Scandinavian Airlines System AB Spanair SA -0.0348 0.0109 0.0263 
26-Jun-07 SAS AB Spanair SA 0.0138 0.0260 -0.0329 
14-Feb-08 SAS AB Go Now AS 0.0247 0.0260 0.0044 
23-Jan-01 Lufthansa AG Composite International Inc -0.0347 -0.0544 -0.0140 
11-Nov-02 Deutsche Lufthansa AG British midland Airways Ltd -0.1099 -0.0522 -0.0202 
10-Feb-05 Deutsche Lufthansa AG Amadeus Global Travel Distribution SA -0.0121 0.0081 0.0010 
21-Jun-07 Deutsche Lufthansa AG Swiss International Air Lines Ltd 0.0522 0.0521 0.0220 
29-Oct-08 Deutsche Lufthansa AG Eurowings Luftverkehrs AG -0.1629** -0.1153** -0.0280 
1-Nov-04 Transat AT Inc Air Consultants Europe 0.0076 0.0213 0.0003 
13-Mar-06 Transat AT Inc Thomas Cook Travel Ltd 0.0954 0.0643 -0.0061 
13-Jul-07 Transat AT Inc L'Europeennee de Tourisme SARL -0.0191 0.0334 -0.0141 
1-Jan-00 British Airways PLC Comair -0.0935 -0.0600 -0.0173 
2-Jul-08 British Airways PLC Elysair SAS 0.1625 0.1320 0.0473 
16-May-02 EasyJet PLC Newgo 1 Ltd 0.1136 0.2352*** 0.0939** 
25-Oct-07 EasyJet PLC GB Airways Ltd 0.0493 0.0814 0.0385 
11-Oct-06 Air Partner PLC Gold Air International Ltd 0.1309 0.1183 0.0307 
6-Sep-07 Air Partner PLC Air Partner International SAS -0.0464 -0.0361 0.0002 
25-May-07 Riverhawk Aviation Inc Profile Aviation Center Inc 0.9453 1.1566* 0.8900*** 
19-Mar-08 Riverhawk Aviation Inc Carolina Air Charter Inc -0.7261 -0.1116 0.6693* 
9-Oct-00 Continental Airlines Inc DC Air 0.0300 -0.0319 -0.0076 
9-Sep-02 JetBlue Airways Live LLC 0.2238 0.2073** 0.1140** 
31-Jan-03 Ryanair Holdings Plc buzz -0.0209 0.0127 0.0432 
10-Dec-04 Southwest Airlines Inc Certain assets of ATA Airlines Inc -0.0572 -0.0296 0.0019 
1-Aug-05 Republic Airways Holdings Inc US Airways' 10 Embraer 170s and Other Assets 0.0200 0.0325 0.0208 
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Continued 
15-Aug-05 Skywest Inc Atlantic Southeast Airlines Inc 0.1456 0.1966*** 0.1545*** 
18-Jan-07 Pinnacle Airlines Corp Colgan Air Inc -0.1527 -0.1095 -0.0341 
24-Apr-07 Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA FlyNordic AB 0.2590*** 0.1925*** 0.1288*** 
20-Jun-07 Discovery Air Inc Top Aces Inc -0.1089 -0.0549 -0.0621 
21-Jun-07 Air France-KLM Martinair Holland NV -0.0124 -0.0370 -0.0200 
14-Apr-08 Delta Air Lines Inc Northwest Airlines Corp -0.1470 -0.0217 -0.0186 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10% level, 5% level and 1%, respectively. 
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The individual results from different event windows validate the two assumptions 
made in the methodology section.  
 
First of all, these results are inconsistent with market efficiency hypothesis. As many 
management studies use quite long event windows, this means that some researchers 
don’t think the effects of events are quickly incorporated into stock prices 
(McWilliams and Siegel 1997). They believe the stock market is inefficient at least 
during short-term. Especially in the cases of mergers and acquisitions, information 
about the number of potential acquirers and their evaluation of the target may be 
revealed over a relatively long period (Ebneth and Theuvsen 2007). Our results are 
very interesting: the shorter the length of the event window, the more the number of 
the significant results. Specially, all significant results under the 3-day event window 
show the positive cumulative abnormal returns. This indicates investors could earn 
positive abnormal returns directly by buying or selling based on the announcement of 
M&A transactions. In other words, the stock prices don’t incorporate all new publicly 
available information during the short term. Thus the empirical results are consistent 
with previous studies. The stock market is inefficient at least in the short run.  
 
Secondly, before the announcement date of M&As, most investors don’t have any 
information about M&As. Then abnormal returns can be regarded as the result of the 
stock market’s reaction to new information about the unanticipated events. The 
empirical results show that the M&A transactions result in significant changes on the 
stock price of the acquiring firms after announcement date. Our results also prove the 
unanticipated events assumption.  
 
Besides the significant results are coincident with those two assumptions, the total 
results propose an important and interesting question. If bidder’s cumulative abnormal 
returns are not positive significantly or even negative, why do the bidding firms still 
make acquisitions? Like SAS or Deutsche Lufthansa AG, both of them have five 
M&A transactions from 2000 to 2008. But few deals create a statistically significant 
positive value for the bidding firm. There are just two significant results and one of 
them even has a negative CAR, leading to destroy the bidder’s value. There are 
several possible answers to this question. First of all, the zero returns to bidders are 
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consistent with a competitive corporate control market in which firms earn normal 
returns in their operations (Weston, Siu et al. 2001). Secondly, for many M&A 
activities, the bidder probably has already had some share ownership of the target firm 
before mergers and acquisition. So any gains from M&A may have already been 
reflected in the acquiring firm’s stock price when the prior share ownership was 
obtained (Mei and Sun 2008). Finally, the difference of firm size between bidders and 
target firms also could cause the insignificance of bidders’ returns. Even though there 
is a good deal, M&As could still have little impact on the bidder's stock price since 
the size of targets may be small relative to the bidder. 
 
4.3 Aggregation of Abnormal Returns 
 
Although some individual M&A transactions cumulate a significantly positive 
abnormal return for the shareholders of bidding firms, we don’t know if the abnormal 
returns over the whole sample are still positive. So we aggregate the abnormal returns 
both across securities and through time. Table 3 represents all the results of the 
average cumulative abnormal return under different event windows.  
 
Table 3. The Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
 Multifactor Model Market Model 
Event window CAAR 21 CAAR 11 CAAR 3 CAAR 21 CAAR 11 CAAR 3 
Minimum -0.7261 -0.1153 -0.0623 -0.1569 -0.1793 -0.0661 
Maximum 0.9453 1.1566 0.8900 1.0627 1.1465 0.8800 
Median 0.0107 0.0118 0.0015 -0.0019 0.0121 0.0044 
Average 0.0204 0.0575** 0.0628*** 0.0412 0.0573** 0.0655*** 
Test Statistics 1.1865 2.4703 3.6752 1.4427 2.6830 4.1440 
Source: Author’s calculations  
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10% level, 5% level and 1%, respectively. 
 
No matter which event window is used, all the average cumulative abnormal returns 
are positive. Except the 21-day event window, CAAR11 increases the stock returns of 
bidding firms by 5.7% over the whole sample at the 5% confidence level, and CAAR 
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3 even creates about 6% returns for bidders’ shareholders. These results strongly 
prove the previous studies that shareholders of some bidding firms realize significant 
gains at a merger announcement period (Knapp, 1990; Kyle et al, 1992; Singal, 
1996).  
 
4.4 Comparative Statics 
 
Although M&A transactions could create value for the bidding firms, the factors 
explaining M&A-success are still unknown. According to the characteristics of M&A 
transactions, we choose the following three factors: the geographic factors (domestic 
or cross-border); the payment factors (stock or cash); the situation of stock market 
(bull market or bear market). We use comparative statics to test whether an identified 
driver of M&A-success has explanatory power. Table 4 summarizes the results from 
different factors. 
 
Table 4.  Comparative Statics under Different Event Windows 
  CAAR 21 CAAR 11 CAAR 3 
Home group 0.0245 0.1009 * 0.1252 
Factor 1 
Cross-border group 0.0168 0.0191 0.0077 
Stock payment group 0.0052 0.0017 0.0110 * 
Factor 2 
Cash payment group 0.0263 0.0793 *** 0.0830 *** 
Bull market group 0.0721 0.0968 ** 0.0651 *** 
Factor 3 
Bear market group -0.0383 0.0129 0.0601 *** 
Source: Author’s calculations  
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10% level, 5% level and 1%, respectively. 
 
The geographical factor only has one significant CAAR at the 10% level. This result 
probably means that domestic transactions provide for a higher potential synergy, 
such as more cost savings, than cross-border transactions (Patrick, Dirk et al. 2004). 
Shareholders of both airlines preferred a merger between the two domestic carriers 
(Zhang and Aldridge 1997). However, the geographical factor in our empirical results 
doesn’t affect the entire CAAR significantly. 
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For the payments factor, the results are consistent with the previous research that 
bidder’s shareholders prefer cash payments (Myers and Majluf 1984). When the 
management of the acquiring firms believes their stocks are undervalued by the stock 
market, they want to pay cash to the targets instead of stock. Compared with stock 
transactions, M&As create more wealth for bidder’s shareholder in cash transactions 
(Becher 2000). On the other hand, the choice of method of payment shows that 
evaluation of the bidder management about their stocks.  
 
For the situation of stock market, the transactions under the bull market can create 
value for the acquiring firms. On the one hand, the potential acquiring firms probably 
have higher stock prices to facilitate an acquisition. On the other hand, a bidding 
firm’s stock price increases more when recent mergers had positive responses from 
the market. The market also rewards firms whose previous mergers it has liked. 
Further, a hot stock market leads to better announcement returns (Rosen Richard 
2006). 
 
4.5 Cross-sectional Regression Analysis 
 
The comparative statics can only test one factor of M&A-success at the same time. In 
order to investigate the association between the magnitude of the abnormal returns 
and the characteristics specific to the event observations, we run the cross-sectional 
regressions. Besides those three factors as dummy variables, two additional numerical 
variables are included: total assets and total revenue. Since the coefficients for all the 
variables are insignificant when we employ cross-sectional regression regarding CAR 
(-10, + 10) or CAR (-5, +5) as the dependent variable. We just show the significant 
one—CAR (-1, +1). The results are shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Cross-sectional Regression Analysis for CAR (-1, +1) 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Probability 
Total assets 0.000147 0.006900 0.9945 
Total revenue -0.058564 -2.532983 0.0177 
Bull market -0.104941 -2.057007 0.0498 
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Domestic transaction 0.021292 0.365499 0.7177 
Cash payment -0.059295 -0.977778 0.3372 
Constant term 0.575175 5.460461 0.0000 
R-squared 0.595325 Adjusted R-squared 0.517503 
F-statistic 7.649818 Probability (F-statistic) 0.000156 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
In table 5, only two variables have significant values. As a result that the coefficient 
of total assets is strongly insignificant, the firm size of the bidding firm has no effect 
on the cumulative abnormal return. The sign of the coefficient of total revenue is also 
different from our expectation. An increase in the total revenue of bidding firms will 
decrease the cumulative abnormal returns of the M&A transactions by 5.9% at the 5% 
confidence level. With the growth of the total revenue, the management of the 
acquiring firms probably wants to smooth the earrings through paying dividends for 
the shareholders. The dividend payments reduce the operating cash flow, leading to a 
negative signal for the investors. So the cumulative abnormal returns decrease as the 
stock price decreases during the M&A period. For the rest of dummy variables, 
domestic transactions do not show any relationship with the cumulative abnormal 
returns. Though cash payments have a negative sign, it is insignificant. However, the 
sign of bull market is statistically negative at the 5% significant level. That means the 
cumulative abnormal returns under bull market will be less 10.5% than those in the 
bear market.  The two potential reasons can explain this result. On the one hand, a 
bidder may find a target to be more attractive in the bear market. Despite the stock 
performance for both bidder and targets firm is poor under bear market, it is a good 
opportunity for bidder to acquire target firm. Because the stock price of the target has 
a poor performance, the cost of acquisition for bidding firm is relatively low. On the 
other hand, by avoiding cluster when identifying M&As, the residual term is assumed 
to be cross-sectionally uncorrelated and homoskedastic (MacKinlay 1997). However, 
this assumption of cross-sectional regression may be not suitable for the actual cases. 
So we may get the opposite result for the market situation factors.  
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5. Summary and Managerial Implications 
 
This paper used event study methodology to test whether the mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) transactions could create value for the acquiring firm as a result of the data 
limited. We selected 32 M&A activities from 2000 to 2008 in order to analyze the 
announcement effects of North American and European Airline firms. Compared with 
the previous researches, our empirical results proved that there were significant 
differences about the M&A impacts on bidder’s financial performance, expressed in 
increasing or decreasing stock prices. Most literatures documented that the target 
firms could gain significantly from M&A transactions, while the announcement 
effects for acquiring firms were usually negative, or the bidding firms earned little 
positive returns. But our study demonstrates that M&A transactions can create a 
significant positive value for the acquiring firm by both quantitative and qualitative 
analysis.  
 
First of all, we analyzed M&As’ effects on individual bidding firms by calculating the 
cumulative abnormal returns under different event windows. The individual security 
analysis addressed that most of significant results in the M&As transactions had a 
positive impact on the acquiring firm’s stock price. Then we examined the entire 
effects of the M&As announcements over the whole sample. The average cumulative 
abnormal returns still increased the performance of bidders’ stock in the financial 
market significantly. Both these two quantitative analysis proved that M&A 
transactions created value for the bidding firm in the North American and European 
airline industry. Qualitative analysis was necessary to investigate the factors of 
M&A-success. The results from comparative statics indicated that domestic 
transaction, cash payment in transaction and bull markets had a positive effect on the 
cumulative abnormal returns under event window (-5, +5; -1, +1), while stock 
payment and bear market also positively affected the cumulative abnormal return only 
in the 3-day event window. Finally, we ran the cross-sectional regression to assess the 
effects of the variables explaining M&A-success at the same time. The results were 
almost similar to that of comparative statics. The significant difference was the CAR 
in bull market was less than that in bear market. The potential explanation was the 
low transaction cost of M&A under bear market led to a higher cumulative abnormal 
return for bidders compared with bull market situation. The growth in total revenue of 
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bidding firm resulted in a decrease in CARs since dividend payment to smooth 
earning may lower the stock price during the event window. There was no significant 
relationship between the bidding firm’s size and value creation.  
 
The empirical results of this paper could be of great importance for shareholders, 
investors and management. Shareholders and investors pay attention to the market 
reaction to the important strategic decisions such as deciding on M&As since these 
decisions have a large impact on airline companies’ future competitive positions and 
wealth. Management may obtain efficient information from stock market to help 
acquisition decisions (Ebneth and Theuvsen 2007). The results of event studies don’t 
only illustrate the efficiency of M&A which creates value for bidders in airline 
industry, but also the influence of the method of transaction payment and the timing 
of the announcement (Panayides and Gong 2002). The empirical evidence gives the 
management of bidding firm some guidelines for the future M&A activities.
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7. Appendix  
7.1 Appendix I 
 
 
CAR (-10, 10) of Each Event -Multifactor Model 
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Continental Airlines CAR(-10,+10)
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Riverhawk Aviation CAR(-10,+10)
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
CA
R
Carolina Air Charter Profile Aviation Center
 
 
Transat AT Inc (-10,+10)
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
CA
R
Air Consutants Europe Thomas Cook Travl Ltd L'Europeennee de
 
 
Ryanair Holdings CAR(-10,+10)
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
CA
R
Buzz
 
June 2009, Lund 
 34 
Skywest Airline CAR(-10,+10)
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7.2 Appendix II 
Table 1. Individual CAR Significant Test- Market Model 
 
Event date Target Acquiror CAR(-10,+10) CAR(-5,+5) CAR(-1,+1) 
20-Apr-01 SAS Norge ASA SAS AB 0.0820 0.0188 0.0948*** 
1-Nov-01 Air Baltic Scandinavian Airlines System AB 0.2718 -0.0043 -0.0514 
22-Nov-03 Spanair SA Scandinavian Airlines System AB -0.0800 -0.0301 0.0266 
26-Jun-07 Spanair SA SAS AB 0.0502 0.0241 -0.0437 
14-Feb-08 Go Now AS SAS AB 0.0341 0.0313 0.0030 
23-Jan-01 Composite International Inc Lufthansa AG -0.0883 -0.0576 -0.0209 
11-Nov-02 British midland Airways Ltd Deutsche Lufthansa AG 0.0257 0.0063 -0.0331 
10-Feb-05 Amadeus Global Travel Distribution SA Deutsche Lufthansa AG -0.0089 -0.0042 -0.0026 
21-Jun-07 Swiss International Air Lines Ltd Deutsche Lufthansa AG 0.0640 0.0639 0.0324 
29-Oct-08 Eurowings Luftverkehrs AG Deutsche Lufthansa AG -0.1542 -0.0989 0.0181 
1-Nov-04 Air Consultants Europe Transat AT Inc 0.0655 0.0683 0.0177 
13-Mar-06 Thomas Cook Travel Ltd Transat AT Inc -0.0146 0.0611 -0.0079 
13-Jul-07 L'Europeennee de Tourisme SARL Transat AT Inc -0.0123 0.0328 -0.0141 
1-Jan-00 Comair British Airways PLC -0.0990 -0.0306 0.0117 
2-Jul-08 Elysair SAS British Airways PLC -0.0935 0.1628 -0.0079 
16-May-02 Newgo 1 Ltd EasyJet PLC 0.0699 0.2212*** 0.1099*** 
25-Oct-07 GB Airways Ltd EasyJet PLC 0.0051 0.1090 0.0643 
11-Oct-06 Gold Air International Ltd Air Partner PLC 0.1353 0.1200 0.0315 
6-Sep-07 Air Partner International SAS Air Partner PLC -0.0299 -0.0367 -0.0151 
25-May-07 Profile Aviation Center Inc Riverhawk Aviation Inc 1.0627 1.1465 * 0.8800*** 
19-Mar-08 Carolina Air Charter Inc Riverhawk Aviation Inc 0.1164 -0.1793 0.6509* 
9-Oct-00 DC Air Continental Airlines Inc 0.0345 -0.0486 -0.0143 
9-Sep-02 LiveTV LLC JetBlue Airways 0.1156 0.1237 0.1043** 
31-Jan-03 buzz Ryanair Holdings Plc -0.0798 -0.0034 0.0911** 
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Continued 
10-Dec-04 Certain assets of ATA Airlines Inc Southwest Airlines Inc -0.0520 -0.0370 -0.0012 
1-Aug-05 US Airways' 10 Embraer 170s and Other Assets Republic Airways Holdings Inc -0.0175 0.0180 0.0059 
15-Aug-05 Atlantic Southeast Airlines Inc Skywest Inc 0.1460* 0.1979*** 0.1545*** 
18-Jan-07 Colgan Air Inc Pinnacle Airlines Corp -0.1569 -0.1176 -0.0320 
24-Apr-07 FlyNordic AB Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA 0.2160*** 0.1687*** 0.1227*** 
20-Jun-07 Top Aces Inc Discovery Air Inc -0.1069 -0.0569 -0.0661 
21-Jun-07 Martinair Holland NV Air France-KLM -0.0370 -0.0193 -0.0044 
14-Apr-08 Northwest Airlines Corp Delta Air Lines Inc -0.1462 -0.0152 -0.0094 
Source: Author’s calculation  
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10% level, 5% level and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 2. Cross- sectional Analysis Results of CAR (-5, +5) - Multifactor Model 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Probability 
Total assets -0.023091 -0.707941 0.4853 
Total revenue -0.013953 -0.394440 0.6965 
Bull -0.124060 -1.589417 0.1241 
Domestic -0.002484 -0.027875 0.9780 
Cash 0.017550 0.189157 0.8514 
Constant term 0.389524 2.417009 0.0230 
R-squared 0.247752 Adjusted R-squared 0.103088 
F-statistic 1.712610 Probability (F-statistic) 0.167037 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
 
 
Table 3. Cross-sectional Analysis Results of CAR (-10, +10) - Multifactor Model 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Probability 
Total assets -0.031453 -0.811437 0.4245 
Total revenue 0.023087 0.549173 0.5876 
Bull -0.103764 -1.118629 0.2735 
Domestic -0.007252 -0.068466 0.9459 
Cash 0.039001 0.353704 0.7264 
Constant term 0.122693 0.640609 0.5274 
R-squared 0.078031 Adjusted R-squared 0.440105 
F-statistic -0.099270 Probability (F-statistic) 0.816375 
Source: Author’s calculation 
